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NOTES
TAX PENALTIES IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Unsecured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings stand to realize a larger
share in the distribution of the bankrupt's assets following the Supreme Court's
recent holding in Simonson v. Granquist' that section 57(j) of the Bankruptcy
Act 2 bars the federal government's claims for penalties on a bankrupt's unpaid
taxes even though the penalties constitute claims secured by perfected liens.
On certiorari, the Court reviewed two decisions of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit which allowed the Government, in controversies between the
United States and the bankrupts trustee, to recover federal tax penalties against
the estate of the bankrupt inasmuch as those tax penalties constituted perfected
liens on the bankrupt's estate. These decisions followed an earlier decision of
the same circuit3 which had been supported by the Sixth and Tenth Circuits.
4
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits had held contra.5
In Simonson v. Granquist, the lien of the United States for penalties on
unpaid federal taxes arose prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, but
notice of such lien was not filed until after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
Section 6323 Internal Revenue Code 1954 provides that the tax lien of the
United States shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser,
or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed in certain specified
public offices. Here the notice of the lien in question was not filed until after
the bankrupt's property came into the possession or control of the bankruptcy
court. The trustee claimed the position of a judgment creditor within the mean-
ing of section 6323 and that the lien therefore was invalid as to her. The Court
of Appeals held that the trustee was not a judgment creditor within the provision
of the Internal Revenue Code and upheld the decision of the District Court and
the ruling of the referee in bankruptcy which allowed the United States a lien
claim against the bankrupt estate for penalties on unpaid federal taxes.
In United States v. Harris,6 the companion case to Simonson, a referee in
bankruptcy denied lien claims for penalties on unpaid federal taxes asserted by
the United States against properties of the Alaska Telephone Corporation, a
debtor in reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. The District
Court affirmed the ruling of the referee, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the lien claims of the United States for penalties were not invalidated by
the provision of the Bankruptcy Act that debts owing to the United States as a
penalty shall not be allowed, except for the amount of pecuniary loss sustained
'82 Sup. Ct. 537 (1962), reversing 287 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961) and United States v.
Harris, 287 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1961).
230 Stat. 561 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1958).
'In re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1939).
'United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Kentucky v. Farmers Bank,
139 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1943).
'United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1959) ; United States v. Phillips,
267 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1959).
8287 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1961).
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by the transaction out of which the penalty arose. Thus, the lien claim of the
United States was allowed as a secured claim against the properties of the
debtor corporation.
The two provisions of the Bankruptcy Act which have particular relevance
to the question are sections 57(j) 7 and 67(b).8 Section 57(j) provides:
Debts owing to the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof as a
penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary
loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or
forfeiture arose, with reasonable and actual costs occasioned thereby and such interest
as may have accrued on the amount of such loss according to law.
Section 67(b) states:
[S]tatutory liens for taxes and debts owing to the United States or to any State
or any subdivision thereof, created or recognized by the laws of the United States
or of any State, may be valid against the trustee, even though arising or perfected
while the debtor is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the peti-
tion initiating a proceeding under this Act by or against him. Where by such laws
such liens are required to be perfected and arise but are not perfected before bank-
ruptcy, they may nevertheless be valid, if perfected within the time permitted by
and in accordance with the requirements of such laws ...
The Government argued that section 57(j) should be interpreted to apply
to unsecured penalty claims only, and that secured claims, even though for
penalties, should be allowed under section 67(b). While section 57(j) pro-
hibits the allowance of penalty claims in bankruptcy without regard to whether
such claims are secured or unsecured, the Government contended that the Bank-
ruptcy Act leaves creditors secured by mortgages and liens free to enforce their
claims directly against the property by which those claims are secured, that the
"claims" referred to are not the claims of secured creditors but those of unse-
cured creditors, and that only those penalties are barred which have not yet
ripened into a lien so as to become a charge upon the bankrupt's property.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, expressed the opinion that the
language of section 57(j), a part of the Bankruptcy Act since its enactment in
1898, was broad enough to bar all penalties, whether secured by lien or not,
and that the section plainly manifested a Congressional purpose to bar all claims
of any kind against a bankrupt except those where the claimant has suffered a
pecuniary loss. The section 9
Ills in keeping with the broad aim of the Act to provide for the conservation
of the estates of insolvents to the end that there may be as equitable a distribution
of assets as is consistent with the type of claims involved. Moreover, the prohibition
of all tax penalties in bankruptcy is wholly consistent with the policy of the penalty
provisions themselves. Tax penalties are imposed at least in part as punitive meas-
ures against persons who have been guilty of some default or wrong. Enforcement
of penalties against the estates of bankrupts, however, would serve not to punish
the delinquent taxpayers, but rather their entirely innocent creditors.
Additionally, Mr. Justice Black found nothing in section 67(b) which indi-
cated a purpose to require the general creditors of a bankrupt to suffer because
30 Stat. 561 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1958).
s52 Stat. 876 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1958).
S82 Sup. Ct. at 539.
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of penalties designed to be inflicted upon the bankrupt himself. Section 67(b)
omits any mention of penalties, and its plain purpose is merely to prevent certain
liens, including statutory tax liens, arising or perfected within four months
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition from being set aside and declared
invalid under section 6010 as preferential. Since section 67(b) expressly de-
clares that it is to take precedence over any provisions of section 60 to the
contrary, it cannot be read as showing a Congressional purpose to make pen-
alties allowable contrary to the special and specific language of section 57(j)
which makes them not allowable.
In reversing the decision of the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Justice Black concluded,
"It is true that the United States has long had an absolute priority for debts
due from insolvent debtors and that the Bankruptcy Act generally accords
secured creditors a preferred position. But section 57(j) places penalties in a
category quite different from ordinary debts, one not favored in bankruptcy,
and the character of a penalty is by no means changed by calling it a lien."'"
A dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in which Mr.
Justice Harlan joined. Mr. Justice Frankfurter agreed with the court below
that liens are unaffected by and are outside the scope of section 57(j). He
recognized that a purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was to ensure an equitable
distribution of assets among creditors, and that denying claims for penalties
against the estate assisted innocent creditors previously handicapped by the
wrongs of the bankrupt. He pointed out, however, that a sharp distinction has
always been drawn between secured and unsecured creditors in bankruptcy,
and that liens have been held unaffected by a discharge in bankruptcy and were
entirely without its scope. "The Bankruptcy Act deals with the distribution of
unencumbered assets among unsecured creditors. Lienholders need no Bank-
ruptcy Act. Liens are independent of and essentially unaffected by bankruptcy
proceedings."' 2
Section 57(j) was designed to protect general creditors against a reduction
of their dividends from a bankrupt estate by reason of penalties or forfeitures
owing by the bankrupt to the United States or one of the States. The Simonson
decision disallowing liened tax penalties as claims against the bankrupt estate
will increase the potency of bankruptcy law as a means of doing equity between
creditors. The decision will ensure that governments will not pre-empt the
debtor's assets at the expense of non-governmental creditors. Furthermore, it
eliminates the wholly incongruous situation that a penalty must be allowed as
a claim against a bankrupt estate in one state, and a similar penalty disallowed
in another, merely because of a statutory lien in one case and not the other,
or that one penalty may be allowed, and another disallowed in the same state
against the same bankrupt due to local statutory provisions.
Ren~e Rubin*
10 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958).
1182 Sup. Ct. at 539.
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